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MacCrate's Missed Opportunity: The
MacCrate Report's Failure to Advance
Professional Values
by Russell G. Pearce*
The 1992 Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession: Narrowing the Gap (the "Task Force"), Legal Education Professional Development - An Educational Continuum,'
popularly known as the MacCrate Report (the "Report"), was
the most ambitious effort to reform legal education in the past
generation. 2 Some commentators have described the Report as
"the greatest proposed paradigm shift in legal education since
Langdell envisioned legal education as the pursuit of legal sci3
ence through the case method in the late 19th century."
Although the Report sought to promote education in both
lawyering skills and values, its major influence has been in the
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and
Ethics, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Gary Munneke
for his leadership of this symposium (and his leading scholarship on the legal profession), and for suggesting that I write on this challenging topic. I am especially
grateful to Gary, Russell Engler, and the other symposium participants for their
wise comments. As always, I deeply appreciate the insights my colleagues provided at a Fordham Faculty Workshop on this paper.
1. A.B.A., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFES-

SION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report].

2. See Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact
and Identifying the Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 11415 (2001). As Russell Engler notes, Robert MacCrate and others "placed the Report in the context of previous efforts including the Reed Report (1921), the writings of Jerome Frank in the 1930's and 1940's, and the Crampton Report (1979)."

Id. at 115. See Robert MacCrate, Keynote Address-The 21st Century Lawyer: Is
There a Gap to be Narrowed?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 517, 517-20 (1994). MacCrate
expressly compared the work of the Task Force to the project of the "Llewellyn
Curriculum Committee" of the "1940s" in seeking "to create a conceptual vision of
the lawyering skills and professional values that lawyers should seek to acquire."
Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum,
64 TENN. L. REV. 1099, 1127 (1997).
3. Wallace Loh, The MacCrateReport-Heuristicor Prescriptive?, 69 WASH. L.
REV. 505, 505 (1994). Others have criticized the Report as unrealistic or wrongheaded. See Engler, supra note 2, at 117-19.
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area of lawyering skills. 4 The Report has contributed little to
promoting professional values. 5 This result is not surprising.
The Report's treatment of values suffers from two basic flaws.
First, the text makes values a low priority and then does not
explain them coherently. Second, the Task Force fails to consider that the dominant values of the Bar and the Academy oppose those of the Report.
Despite these inherent flaws, the Report has succeeded
somewhat in its goal of catalyzing reflection on values. While
this reflection may yet yield important results, the Report's contribution could have been far greater. The Report missed the
opportunity to focus the Bar and the Academy on the major
changes in practice and legal education necessary to promote
the very values the Report expressly endorses.
I.

The MacCrate Report on Values

The Report describes a diverse profession united around
core values and seeks only to identify those core values and ensure that they receive proper attention in legal education and
legal practice.
A.

The Origin of the Task Force

In 1987, at a conference "celebrat[ing] twenty years of effort
and achievement since the Ford Foundation . . . set in motion
the clinical education movement," 6 Justice Rosalie Wahl of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, the Chair of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, asked those in attendance to "recommit themselves 'to certain basic principles,'
including that of teaching students how to learn systematically
from experience and simultaneously to educate them in a
broader range of legal analysis and skills than have traditionally been taught."7 She asked, "'[h]ave we really tried to determine . . . what skills, what attitudes, what character traits,
what qualities of mind are required of lawyers?'" In early
4. See Gary A. Munneke, Legal Skills for a TransformingProfession, 22 PACE
L. REV. 105, 150 (2001).

5.
6.
7.
8.

See infra notes 91-93.
MacCrate, supra note 2, at 521.
Id. at 521.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss2/6

2

2003]

MACCRATE'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY

577

1989, Justice Wahl created the Task Force to answer these
questions. 9 After collecting data, holding public hearings, and
conducting extensive deliberations over a period of almost three
years, the Task Force issued the Report in July 1992.10
B.

The Report Praises the Legal Profession and Its Values

The Report describes the progressive evolution of the legal
profession to its current position of prominence. In the early
nineteenth century, the Bar first began to develop the institutional framework for self-regulation: law schools, bar associations, and judicial supervision." At the same time, in the
"successive writings" 12 of the first American legal ethicists, Pro14
fessor David Hoffman 13 in 1836 and Judge George Sharswood
in 1854, as well as in Judge Thomas Goode Jones's Alabama
ethical code of 188715 and the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics, 16 "there gradually evolved a concept of professionalism
for the American lawyer, based upon obligations and responsi7
bilities both voluntarily assumed and required by society."1
Professionalism required that lawyers have "a special body of
learning and skills" and a "core body of values which . . . justifie[d] their claim to an exclusive right to engage in the profession's activities."' 8 The modern expression of these values is
contained in the preamble to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 19 which describes law as a "self-governing and learned
9. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at xi.
10. See id. at xi-xiii.
11. See id. at 105.
12. See id. at 110.
13. For a discussion of the context of Hoffman's contribution, see Russell G.
Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of
the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 831, 388-89 (2001) [hereinafter CHICAGO RoUNDTABLE].
14. For a discussion of the context of the contribution of Sharswood, who was
the father of our modem field of ethics, see id. at 389-92; Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Originsof the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
241 (1992) [hereinafter Rediscovering].
15. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 109; Rediscovering, supra note 14, at
243-44.
16. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 109; Rediscovering, supra note 14,
at 243-46; CHICAGO ROUNDTABLE, supra note 13, at 400 nn.174-80 and accompanying text.
17. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 110.
18. Id. at 108.
19. See id. at 111.
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profession" and states that "[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having
20
special responsibility for the quality of justice."
Despite the many changes in the Bar in the twentieth century, the core values represent a "loosely defined but distinct
identity" that "[t]he profession has successfully created . . .
[and] with which most lawyers can identify."2 1 The Bar today is
"larger and more diverse than ever before" 22 in terms of practice
areas and practitioners. 23 Nonetheless, the legal profession is
"more organized and unified . . . than at any time in its history."24 The Report notes the dramatic increase in the percentage of lawyers belonging to the ABA and the "vast majority"
who belong to any bar association, 2 5 together with "the unifying
experience" of law school "as the common gateway to the profes26
sion and the universal control by the judiciary over entry."
The Report rejects the notion inherent in the Task Force's
title, Narrowing the Gap, that a serious gap actually exists between the Bar and the Academy. 27 The Report suggests instead
that the problem is one of communication and perception that
could be solved if academics and practitioners could appreciate
more fully each other's role and contributions. 28 Indeed, the Report applauds law schools for "tak[ing] seriously their responsibilities with regard to the teaching of ethical standards and
professional values." 29 While acknowledging potential for improvement, the Report seeks to assist law schools, the practicing bar, and the judiciary in enhancing what they are already
doing well-fulfilling their shared responsibility for educating
skilled and ethical lawyers. 30 The Report describes the task of
"perpetuation of core legal knowledge together with the funda20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1993).

21. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 111.
22. Id. at 11.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 29-35.
Id. at 110.
See id. at 110-11.
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 111.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 4-6.
Id. at 235.
See id. at 8.
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mental lawyering skills and professional values" as essential to
31
survival of a single legal profession in the 21st century.
C.

The MacCrate Report's Articulation of Values and
Recommendations for Promoting Them

Relying on the Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills
and Values ("SSV"), 32 the Report identifies four fundamental
lawyering values ("Fundamental Values") and two directly related skills ("Fundamental Skills").3 3 The MacCrate Report
draws its four Fundamental Values from the values found in
the Preamble to the ABA Model Rules. 34 The first Fundamental
Value, "Provision of Competent Representation," 35 arises from
the lawyer's duty as a representative of clients. 36 The competence value requires the commitment of any practitioner to develop and maintain the "Fundamental Skills" listed in the
SSV. 37
The second Fundamental Value, "Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality,"38 arises from the lawyer's position
as "a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality
of justice."39 The standards for this value demand that the lawyer should incorporate these values "inone's own daily practice,"40 in "contributing to the profession's fulfillment of its
responsibility to ensure that adequate legal services are provided to those who cannot afford to pay for them,"41 and in "contributing to the profession's fulfillment of its responsibility to
31. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 120.
32. Id. at 135.
33. See id.
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1993).
35. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 207.
36. See id. at 213.
37. It therefore requires little further attention in assessing the Report's contribution to the area of professional values. What is more interesting about the
value of competence is how it imports the view, implicit in the Statement of Skills,
that the conventional pedagogy of the law school classroom teaches only two of the
ten skills necessary to competent lawyering (Skill 2: Legal Analysis and Reasoning and Skill 3: Legal Research). MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 138-40. See
Ian Weinstein, Testing Multiple Intelligences: Comparing Evaluation by Simulation and Written Exam, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 252 (2001).
38. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 213.
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1993).

40. Id. at 213 (Standard 2.1) (capitalization and italics omitted).
41. Id. (Standard 2.2) (capitalization and italics omitted).
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enhance the capacity of law and legal institutions to do
42
justice."
The third Fundamental Value, "Striving to Improve the
Profession," 43 is an obligation of membership in a "self-governing" profession. 44 The Value requires the lawyer to "participat[e] in activities designed to improve the profession," 45
"assist[ I in the training and preparation of new lawyers and the
continuing education of the bar,"46 and "strive to rid the profession of bias based on race, religion, ethnic origin, gender, sexual
orientation, age, or disability, and to rectify the effects of these
47
biases."
The fourth Fundamental Value, "Professional Self-Development,"48 refers to the obligations of the member of a "learned
profession" 49 to "seek[ ] out and tak[e] advantage of opportunities to increase one's own knowledge and improve one's own
skills,"5° as well as to "select[ ] and maintain[ ] employment that
will allow the lawyer to develop as a professional and to pursue
his or her professional . . .goals." 51 "Professional self-development" obligates lawyers to do their best to fulfill the first three
52
Fundamental Values.
All Fundamental Skills, of course, relate to the first Fundamental Value of "Competent Representation" and the fourth
Fundamental Value of "Professional Development."' 53 Two of
these skills are connected directly to the second Fundamental
Value of "promot[ing] justice, fairness, and morality."54 These
are Fundamental Skill 6 on "Counseling" 55 and Fundamental
Skill 10 on "Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas." 56
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. (Standard 2.3) (capitalization and italics omitted).
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 216.
See id. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1993).
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 216 (Standard 3.1).
Id. at 216 (Standard 3.2) (capitalization and italics omitted).
Id. (Standard 3.3) (capitalization and italics omitted).
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 218.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1993).
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 218 (Standard 4.1).
Id. at 219 (Standard 4.2).
See id. at 218.
Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 213.
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 176.
Id. at 203.
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Fundamental Skill 6 expressly seeks to implement the
second Fundamental Value.5 7 Fundamental Skill Standard
6.4(d)(iv) requires a lawyer to counsel clients on "considerations
of justice, fairness, or morality" to the extent "relevant" and "required or permitted by ethical standards. 5' 8 Standard 6.1(a)(iii)
requires a lawyer to the "extent to which it is proper" to
"[a]ttempt[ ] to persuade the client to modify his or her decisions
or actions to accommodate the interests of justice, fairness, or
morality" and, if the client refuses, to "tak[e] action to safeguard
the interest of third-parties or the general public" or
"[w]ithdraw [ ] from representation .. .
In contrast to Fundamental Skill 6, Fundamental Skill 10
does not acknowledge a direct connection to the Fundamental
Values. Fundamental Skill 10 focuses primarily on "recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas" arising under the ethics
rules. 60 When Fundamental Skill 10 refers to "[t]he fundamental ethical rules that shape the profession and define what it
means to be a legal professional," 61 it does not refer to the Fundamental Values. Instead, Skill 10 mentions the ethics rules
generally, and the duties of "competence," "zealousness," "loyalty," and "confidentiality" specifically. 62 Nevertheless, Skill 10,
in fact, serves the goal of "promot[ing] justice, fairness, and morality"63 by requiring lawyers to consider "[a]spects of ethical
philosophy bearing upon the propriety of particular practices or
64
conduct," as well as "[a] lawyer's personal sense of morality."
Of course, if following the profession's rule of ethics promotes
"justice, fairness, and morality," or "improve[s] the legal profession," then Fundamental Skill 10 implements Fundamental
65
Values.
Many of the Report's sixty-one Recommendations refer to
skills and values. These Recommendations ask law schools to
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 177, 182, 184.
Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 177 (cross-referenced in Value Standard 2.1(a) - (b)).
See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 203-07 (capitalization omitted).
Id. at 205.
See id. at 205.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 204.
See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 203.
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distribute the SSV, identify the SSV content of classes, 66 explain the "concepts and theories" underlying the skills and values, 67 use "permanent faculty" for skills and values
69
instruction, 68 and assess how best to teach skills and values.
These Recommendations also ask the ABA to emphasize "skills
70
and values instruction in the accreditation process."
Only a few of the Recommendations exclusively concern
fundamental values. The Report urges law schools to teach that
these fundamental values are "as important in preparing for
71
professional practice as acquisition of substantive knowledge"
and "convey to students that the professional value of the need
to 'promote justice, fairness and morality' is an essential ingredient of the legal profession ....,"72 While "[1]aw schools should
play an important role in developing the skill of 'recognizing
and resolving ethical dilemmas,'" their effectiveness "is necessarily very limited compared to the variety and complexity of
the dilemmas presented in practice." 73 Accordingly, the Report
asks practicing lawyers to take responsibility "for inculcating
professional values through contact with students in part-time
work and summer jobs and as colleagues and mentors in the
early years of practice." 74 They "should ...impress on students
that success in the practice of law is not measured by financial
rewards alone, but by a lawyer's commitment to a just, fair and
'75
moral society.

66. Id. at 331.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 333-34.
Id. at 330.
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 330.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 332.
Id.
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 333.
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The MacCrate Report's Marginal Influence on
Professional Values

Ten Years After the Statement of Values and
Recommendations

Absent the disciplined data collection Russell Engler proposes, 76 an assessment of the MacCrate Report's impact must
remain largely anecdotal and impressionistic. The Report has
inspired numerous conferences and articles, 77 as well as an annotated bibliography which "group[s]" articles according to the
MacCrate Report's 10 Fundamental Skills, and in non-skills
courses alone lists "204 articles" on the subject of teaching
skills. 78 The Report appears to have "provided an important impetus for the clinical and skills movement." 79 Professor Gary
Munneke notes that since the MacCrate Report "[c]linics and
skills courses in law schools have continued to proliferate[; b]ar
associations have increasingly offered skills-oriented continuing
legal education and 'bridge-the-gap' programs[; and s]ome
states have added a skill component to the bar exam."8 0 As a
result of the MacCrate Report, the ABA modified accreditation
standards for law schools, adding the requirement of "adequate
8
...instruction in professional skills." '
The MacCrate Report's work on Fundamental Values has
generated far less attention than its work on Fundamental
Skills. 2 The attention on Fundamental Values appears limited
to clinical scholars who either applaud the Report's commitment to social justice or find it "inadequate,"8 3 and to the meet76. See generally Russell Engler, From 10 to 20: A Guide to Utilizing the MacCrate Report Over the Next Decade, 23 PACE L. REV. 519 (2003).
77. See id. at 552.
78. See id. at (citing J.P. Oglivy & Karen Czapanskiy, ClinicalEducation:an
Annotated Bibliography, CLINICAL L. REV. 36-37 (Special Issue No. 1, Spring 2001).
79. Munneke, supra note 4, at 130.
80. Id. at 135-36.
81. ABA Accreditation Standard 302(c) (1996); see also Roy Stuckey, Education for the Practiceof Law: The Times They Are A-Changin', 75 NEB. L. REV. 648,
675-76 (1996). For a discussion of other accreditation changes related to the MacCrate Report, see id. at 655-59.
82. See Engler, supra note 2, at 144-49; Munneke, supra note 4, at 133.
83. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical
Education for this Millenium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2000); Ann
Juergens, Using the MacCrateReport to Strengthen Live-Client Clinics, 1 CLINICAL
L. REV. 411, 420 (1994); Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Learning Through Service in a
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ings of the ABA Section on Legal Education that sponsored the
MacCrate Report.8 4 While many law schools have emphasized
the Fundamental Skills,88 few schools report teaching the Fundamental Values.8 6 Those institutions that have sought to instill the values, have made it a lower priority than acquiring
skills 8 7 and have encouraged only public service and pro bono
work, a narrow portion of the duty to promote justice.8 8 The
Report's broader goal of integrating the promotion ofjustice into
ClinicalSetting: The Effect of Specialization on Social Justice and Skills Training,
7 CLINICAL L. REV. 307 (1995). Many clinicians "criticized the SSV for.. . placing
too great an emphasis on skills rather than values [and] giving inadequate attention to the ways in which the law and legal institutions negatively affect the poor
and other disenfranchised groups." Mark Heyrman, Regulating Law Schools:
Should the ABA Accreditation Process be Used to Speed the Implementation of the
MacCrateReport Recommendations?, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 389, 390 (1994).
84. ABA SEC. LEGAL EDUC. ADMISSIONS B., REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM
COMMITTEE, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM (1996) [hereinafter TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM].

85. See Engler, supra note 2, at 144-47, 138-44; Engler, supra note 76, at 559.
86. Engler, supra note 2, at 146 (noting that "[i]t would be hard to identify a
school at which dramatic curricular changes were triggered by the MacCrate Report"). One rare example is Engler, supra note 2, at 124, and Engler, supra note
76, at 559-66.
87. Russell Engler's account of the experience at New England School of Law
is instructive. New England responded to the MacCrate Report by expanding
skills training with "energy and creativity ... but with little movement on the
values portion of the report, and in particular on the values that related to Pursuing Equal Justice." Engler, supra note 76, at 556-57. Recognizing this, faculty
advocates of public service used the MacCrate values to promote "the creation of a
new Center for Law and Social Responsibility." Id. at 559. The Center has been
the focus of efforts to encourage student and faculty initiatives. Engler concedes
that "it remains to be seen whether these initiatives will comprise part of a lasting
institutional change, or rather a burst of activity that will fade from view." Id. at
565.
88. See Stephen F. Befort & Eric S. Janus, The Role of Legal Education in
Instilling an Ethos of Public Service Among Law Students: Towards a Collaboration Between the Profession and the Academy on Professional Values, 13 J. L. &
INEQUALITY 1, 2 (1994) (suggesting that the MacCrate Report played a role in the
development of a collaborative program between the Minnesota bar and law
schools to promote public service). Surprisingly, however, the major efforts to promote pro bono and public service in law schools made little or no mention of the
MacCrate Report. See, e.g., Learning to Serve; The Findings and Proposals of the
AALS Commission on Pro Bono and Public Service Opportunities,AALS COMMISSION ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV. OPP. (1999). Perhaps this is because the Report
added nothing to the professionalism movement's commitment to promote pro
bono and public service dating from the 1980s. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, "IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING
OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss2/6
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all aspects of practice and legal education appears to have been
largely ignored.8 9 The Report has received little attention in the
voluminous literature on professional values. 90
B.

The Limits on the Report's Influence

Major flaws in the MacCrate Report's treatment of values
led to the Report's minimal impact in that area. The Report
undermined its own commitment to values by making them a
second priority and failing to express them as coherently as it
did skills. Even had the presentation of values been more effective, the Report's influence still would have been circumscribed.
The Report failed to confront obstacles in the dominant cultures
of the Bar and Academy and to devise successful strategies for
overcoming those obstacles.

89. For example, only a few commentators have referred to the Report's recommendation that law schools teach that values are "as important in preparing for
professional practice as acquisition of substantive knowledge." MacCrate Report,

supra note 1, at 332 (Recommendation 17). A cursory Westlaw search revealed
only the following mentions in a footnote or in passing: Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., et
al., Teaching Legal Ethics: Exploring the Continuum, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
153 (1995); John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes, and the
Futureof American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1993). Moreover, as
Engler notes with regard to both skills and values, "there is little evidence to believe that the MacCrate Report transformed legal education, or led to sweeping
changes when measured by the more ambitious criteria or goals ....
It would
[even] be hard to identify a school at which dramatic curricular changes were triggered by the MacCrate Report." Engler, supra note 2, at 146.
90. Munneke, supra note 4, at 134. For example, leading books on the legal
profession published after the issuance of the MacCrate Report evidence almost no
influence of the MacCrate Report's work on values. See, e.g., MARY A. GLENDON, A
NATION UNDER LAWYERS:
FORMING

How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANS-

AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994) (no reference to MacCrate Report in index);

ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (same); SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 126 (1994) (one

reference to Robert MacCrate's perspective on legal education but with regard to
skills and not values); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000) (no reference in index); WILLIAM H. SIMON,
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998) (no reference in

index).

Notable exceptions to this general observation are the work of some

clinical scholars and the ABA Section on Legal Education, see sources cited supra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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Problems in Presentationof Values
a.

Values as Second Priority

By listing the four Fundamental Values after the ten Fundamental Skills, the MacCrate Report signaled that values are
a lower priority than skills. 91 Indeed, if the Report had followed
a logical order, it would have started with values. The values
are the goals. Once those were identified, the Report would
have determined which skills were necessary to fulfill those
goals.
Why then did the Report place values after skills? Perhaps
the Report reflects the widely held perception that skills are
more important than values. One common illustration is the
92
situation of the star athlete who is caught up in a scandal.
While some commentators bemoan the athlete's failure to serve
as a role model, the general conclusion is that so long as the
athlete continues to star (and does not find himself in jail), the
lapse is forgiven.9 3 Skills are more important than values.
91. As Heyrman notes, many clinical faculty "have criticized the SSV for...
placing too great an emphasis on skills rather than values." Heyrman, supra note
83, at 390.
92. See, e.g., Ronald A. Taylor, For Sports Fans,A Season of Discontent, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 30, 1982, at 49; Mike Wise, Talent Is Not an Excuse for
Today's Bad Behavior, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at D1.
93. For example, David Wells, a pitcher for the New York Yankees, wrote a
book wherein he said, among other things, that he pitched a game while "halfdrunk" and used ephedra, a legal, herbal stimulant, to make it through the season.
As far as his fans were concerned, none of this mattered. One reporter covering a
book signing for Well's book Perfect I'm Not stated, "Wells could have stumbled in
and reeked from here back to Dorian's and fans who came for a signing and a
sighting still would have applauded him, embraced him, [and] lauded him." Jon
Heyman, Not Perfect, but Loved, NEWSDAY, Mar. 20, 2003, at A79. Also recently,
Minnesota Vikings' football player Randy Moss "took unsportsmanlike conduct to
a whole new level" after being arrested for using his car as a battering ram to run
over a Minneapolis traffic control officer. Christian Red, Daily News Special Report: Police Blotter, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 5, 2003, at 57. Moss was also arrested
for marijuana possession. Yet despite this criminal act and other previous run-ins
with the law, some fans still refuse to see Randy Moss as a "bad guy." See Curt
Brown, Supporters See a Misunderstood Moss, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 6,
2002, at 1A. Many fans had a similar response to the recent discovery that Sammy
Sosa had used a corked bat. A newspaper columnist supporting Sosa observed
that, "[I1f Sosa hits the Cubs into the playoffs, he'll make a great story. And the
outrage will be forgotten." John Kass, Drop the Hollow Outrage; Sosa Deserves
Better, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 2003, at 2; see also Rick Telander, The Wrong People for
the Job; Why Expect Athletes to Be Role Models, When They Could Scarcely Be Less
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Similarly, in law school and law practice, the major awards,
like law review editorship or law firm partnership, are awarded
primarily on the basis of skills. While extremely bad values
may be a disqualification, whether an individual's values are
mediocre or excellent is generally irrelevant. Skills are more
important.
b.

The Confusing Integration of Values and Skills

Fundamental Skills 6 and 10, the two skills that should
promote the value of promoting justice, fairness, and morality,
do not succeed in providing adequate guidance for practitioners
and students. Other skills, which implicitly promote particular
values, fail to identify and explain those values.
Fundamental Skill 6 and Fundamental Value 2, which it
implements, fail to provide a persuasive justification for requiring lawyers to engage in moral counseling. Most lawyers conceive of their obligation to further their client's goals as
excluding moral considerations. 94 The Report's contrary conclusion 95 is never clearly explained. The Report cites the Roscoe
Pound's general assertion that the "'primary purpose' of a profession is the '[plursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public
service,"'96 but it's quite a leap from this general statement to
requiring moral counseling. The Report also relies on provisions in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility that
state either a non-binding aspiration to counsel on the morally
just course or a binding obligation to refrain from prejudicing
the administration of justice (which relates more to court appearances than client counseling). 97 The reliance on the Model
Code, which has been superseded by the Model Rules, and the
absence of citation to the Model Rules, suggests that the ethical
rules do not support the Report's position. In fact, the Model
Rules do have a provision closely on point, but that provision
Suited to the Task?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 23, 1991, at 108; Wise, supra note
92.
94. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 20
(1988); Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers Are Morally Accountable, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1805 (2002); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978).
95. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
96. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 213.
97. See id. at 214.
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only allows the lawyer discretion in advising a client to "refer
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation."9 8 It does not require moral counseling.
In addition to failing to provide guidance on the source of
the duty to counsel morally, Fundamental Skill 6 offers little
guidance on when moral counseling is appropriate. Standard
6.4's limiting of moral counseling to occasions when it is "relevant" is confusing. 99 Although it would seem that "justice, fairness, and morality" would be relevant to all decisions, the use of
the term "relevant"10 0 suggests that some decisions do not implicate "justice, fairness, and morality." 1 1 Similarly, Standard 6.4
requires moral counseling when the ethical rules "require or
permit" it. 102 Nowhere does the Report identify when the rules
require moral counseling. Use of the term "permit" suggests
that the Rules would bar moral counseling under some circumstances, but nowhere does the Report identify when this would
occur. 10 3 Standard 6.1 similarly uses the phrase "to the extent
to which it is proper." 10 4 If "proper" means required or permitted by the ethics rules, it suffers the same lack of clarity; if
"proper" refers to a different standard of propriety, that standard is never identified.
Compounding the confusion is the facial inconsistency of
Standards 6.4 and 6.1(a)(iii) with Standard 6.1(b)(ii)(B). The
latter requires the lawyer to "guard against.., be[ing] unable
to... communicate to [the client] that the lawyer is committed
to furthering the client's objectives and interests." 10 5 Any time
a lawyer urges the client to seek what the lawyer considers just,
fair, and moral, the lawyer communicates that the lawyer has
commitments other than "the client's objectives and interests."10 6 The specific requirements of Standard 6.1(a)(iii) go
98.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.2.1 (1993).
99. This phrase does not appear in standards for Value 2, which refers only to

Standard 6.1 and not to 6.4.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.2.1 (1993)..

101. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 177.
102. Id. at 213. In doing so, it tracks Fundamental Value Standard 2.1(a) (b).
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 177 (Skills Standard 6.1(a)(iii)).
Id. at 178.
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 176.
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even further and require the lawyer to "persuade [the] client to
modify his or her decisions" and to take actions to safeguard
non-clients or withdraw if the client refuses to do so. 10 7 The
standards suggest that the lawyer is, or may be, opposed to "the
client's objectives and interests" and will act on that
opposition. 108
Fundamental Skill 10, "Recognizing and Resolving Ethical
Dilemmas," creates a different type of confusion. Skill 10 addresses "ethical dilemmas," the "conduct of law as an ethical
profession,"'10 9 and matters of conscience, as well as questions of
applying the ethical rules. 1 0 Surprisingly, Skill 10 implies a
separation between ethics and values. Skill 10 urges lawyers to
consider ethical philosophy, personal morality, and "fundamental ethical rules that shape the profession and define what it
means to be a legal professional," such as competence, zealousness, loyalty, and confidentiality."' Skill 10 does not even mention the obviously relevant Fundamental Values of "promoting
justice, fairness, and morality," or of "improving the legal profession.""12 Whether this is just an oversight, or an indication
that values are not important to resolving ethical dilemmas, is
not clear.
Another source of confusion is the Report's failure to identify and explain values implicit in a number of the Fundamental Skills. For example, by placing knowledge of alternative
dispute resolution procedures on a par with litigation in Fundamental Skill 8, the Report makes seeking alternative dispute
resolution a priority. 113 Even though important commentators
have challenged the merit of alternative dispute resolution, 1 4
the Report never acknowledges that it has made a value choice
in encouraging this approach. 1 5 Similarly, implicit in Skill 6
are views (sometimes inconsistent) on the priority of client au107. Id. at 177.
108. See id. at 178.
109. Id. at 203.
110. Id. at 203-07.
111. Id. at 205.
112. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 333.
113. See id. at 191-99.
114. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Andrew McThenia & Thomas Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985).
115. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 191-99.

15

590

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:575

tonomy in client counseling. 116 This question is also the subject
of great debate in literature. 117 Here, too, the Report fails to
identify or justify its value preferences.
Indeed, the entire skills section is in part an attack on the
dominant values of legal education. 118 The Report identifies ten
"Fundamental Lawyering Skills," only two of which-"legal
analysis and reasoning" and "legal research"-are priorities of
the pedagogy of the law school classroom. 119 While commentators have recognized the paradigm shifting implications of the
Report's approach for legal education, 120 the Report does not
openly acknowledge or explain the decision to minimize the
121
value of skills gained in the Langdellian classroom.
To be fair, the Report does invite "progressive[] refinement" of the SSV,122 which could perhaps address these weaknesses in the text. However, even if that were done, major
conceptual problems would remain.
2.

Conceptual Obstacles
a. Failureto Make a Persuasive Case for Promoting
Justice

The aspiration of promoting justice, fairness, and morality
is an admirable one. It accords with the Bar's traditional understanding of lawyers as America's governing class charged
with identifying and pursuing the public good. 123 In this view,
lawyers played a key role in government and in the informal
process of managing social and business relationships. In contrast to business people who worked to promote their own self124
interest, lawyers worked to promote the public good.
116. See id. at 176-84.
117. See Stephen Ellman, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of
Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992); William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client
Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991).
118. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 37, at 252.
119. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 138-40, 213 (Standard 2.1).
120. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
121. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 3-8. See Weinstein, supra note 37,
at 252.
122. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 327.
123. See CHICAGO ROUNDTABLE, supra note 13, at 383.
124. See id. at 385.
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Unfortunately for proponents of lawyers' commitment to
the public good, the dominance of the governing class conception ended in the 1960s. 125 Since that time, the hired gun role
has become the standard perception. 126 Most lawyers view
themselves as advocates who pursue the self-interest of their
clients single-mindedly. 27 The two primary characteristics of
this conception are extreme partisanship on behalf of the client
and "moral non-accountability" for the lawyer's conduct in pur28
suing the client's goals.
The Report offers no strategy for countering this understanding. 129 Rather, with minor exception, 30 the Report ignores
the overwhelming sense among commentators that lawyers
have betrayed their obligation to serve the public.' 3 1 In the face
of this consensus among commentators, the Report made the
incredible declaration that "promoting justice, fairness, and mo33
rality" 32 represented a universally held value of the bar.
This assertion relieved the Report's authors from the task of
confronting the prevailing hired gun view and articulating a rationale for promoting justice that might appeal to lawyers and
law students.
This omission guaranteed the Report's
irrelevance.
The only lawyers and law faculty who would embrace the
value of promoting justice would be those who already accepted
it. Those who viewed lawyers as largely self-interested hired
guns would have no reason to change their view. Indeed, they
125. See id. at 404.
126. See id. at 407.
127. See id. at 407-10; Russell G. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift:
Why DiscardingProfessionalIdeology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of
the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1239 (1995) [hereinafter ProfessionalismParadigm Shift].
128. LuBAN, supra note 94, at 52; Schwartz, supra note 94, at 672-73 (emphasis omitted).
129. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 54.
130. Buried in the comments to Fundamental Value 2 are citations to Chief
Justice Rehnquist and the ABA Commission on Professionalism for the proposition
that "'profit maximization'" has caused "many lawyers [to] fail to honor [their pro
bono] obligation." Id. at 215.
131. This sentiment dates at least from Chief Justice Burger's famous 1984
report to the ABA on the decline of professionalism. See ProfessionalismParadigm
Shift, supra note 127, at 1255, 1257.
132. MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 213.
133. See id. at 110-11, 213-17.
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would likely view proponents of the Report's values as elite lawyers and academics who were "hypocrites doing one thing while
saying another, cynics manipulating for their own purposes an
ideology they reject, or naive fools unaware of what everyone
134
else knows."
Even the limited influence the Report has had in encouraging pro bono and public service programs in law schools 135 is not
likely to make a major difference in lawyers' commitment to the
public good. Historically, the growth of public interest law in
the 1960s and the creation of the pro bono duty in the 1970s
actually had the opposite effect. 136 These developments facilitated the transition from the governing class role to that of the
hired gun. The rise of a public interest bar removed responsibility for the public good from law firms and conferred it on the
public interest law community. 137 Similarly, the pro bono duty
shifted the public good from its integral place at the center of
regular firm practice to the marginal arena of pro bono work. 138
Although public interest law and pro bono work add to the
public good, proponents must be careful not to undermine lawyers' commitment to promote justice in all aspects of their work.
The Report admirably avoids this error by placing public service
and pro bono in the context of the more general duty to promote
justice. 139 Nonetheless, by failing to confront the dominant culture of the legal profession and to explain the harm resulting
from narrowly equating justice with public service and pro
bono, the Report may very well encourage such short-sighted
endeavors. Ironically, in one of few value areas where the Report could have made a valuable contribution, its influence may
prove to be counter-productive.
b.

Failure to Acknowledge the Ideology of Legal
Academics

The Report also misses the ideological context of its proposals for implementation of teaching values to law students. The
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

ProfessionalParadigmShift, supra note 127, at 1265.
See sources cited supra note 87.
See CHICAGO ROUNDTABLE, supra note 13, at 420.
See id. at 417-19.
See id. at 419-20.
See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 213-15.
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Report starts from the view that law schools are doing an exemplary job of teaching legal ethics. 140 To make the teaching of the
ethics rules and values more effective, the Report asks law
schools to make clear to students that learning values is as important as substantive knowledge. 14 1 The Report also asserts
that law schools are limited in their ability to teach values and
accordingly makes practicing lawyers responsible for teaching
values to young lawyers, especially "to impress on students that
success in the practice of law is not measured by financial rewards alone, but by a lawyer's commitment to a just, fair and
" 142
moral society.
The Report's conception of lawyers and law students bears
little resemblance to the reality others have described. As discussed above, it is absurd to ask practicing lawyers who, by and
large, reject the primacy of a duty to the public good to take
responsibility for teaching that duty. 43 Similarly, erroneous is
the Report's assumption that law schools are committed to this
goal.144
Contrary to the Report's glowing description of law schools'
success in teaching legal ethics is the legal academy's widely
noted disdain for the topic. 145 As Roger Cramton and Susan
Koniak observe, despite the ABA's 1977 requirement to teach
legal ethics and the resulting growth of scholarship and case
law, "legal ethics remains an unloved orphan of legal education." 14 6 In the words of another commentator, legal ethics is
"the dog of the law school [curriculum]-hard to teach, disappointing to take, and often presented to vacant seats or vacant
minds." 14 7 The teaching of legal ethics "occupies a minor aca140. See id. at 235 ("[A] rich body of teaching materials has emerged during
the past fifteen years that has enriched both professional responsibility and
clinical courses.").
141. See id. at 332 (Recommendation 17).
142. Id. at 333 (Recommendation 19); id. at 332 (Recommendations 15, 16, &

18).
143. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
144. See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 54.
145. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in
the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145, 156 (1996).
146. Id.
147. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31,
40 (1992) (quoting Dale C. Moss, Out of Balance: Why Can't Law Schools Teach
Ethics?, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1991, at 18-19).
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demic role as a one- or two-credit required course in the upperclass years, often taught by adjuncts or by a rotating group of
faculty conscripts," 148 and "[s]erious scholarship in legal ethics
149
is still considered somewhat of an oxymoron."
The attitudes that underlie the disdain for legal ethics similarly undermine support for teaching the values of promoting
justice and improving the legal profession. These attitudes fall
within three perspectives. The first perspective consists of beliefs supporting the view that law school need not expressly
teach values. Some commentators argue that the conventional
classroom teaching using the socratic method develops moral
character. 150 Others find teaching values unnecessary because
they believe in the Business-Profession dichotomy fundamental
to the ideology of professionalism. It assumes that lawyers
work for the public good, unlike business people who seek to
15
promote their own self-interest.
The second perspective is the belief that values cannot be
taught. Many in the Academy believe that students' values
have been fully formed before law school and cannot be
changed. 152 Under this view, teaching values is useless.
Third is the perspective that values should not be taught.
This perspective has its origin in Christopher Columbus Lang53
dell's introduction of a scientific approach to legal pedagogy.
The scientific paradigm "distinguished between facts, which
could be taught, and values, which could not."1 4 As I have
noted elsewhere:
While most law professors today would probably not believe themselves to be scientists, they continue to apply the same pedagogical approach as Langdell and to separate legal from ethical
148. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 145, at 147. See also Russell G. Pearce,
Teaching Ethics Seriously, 29 Loy. U. CHIC. L.J. 719, 724 n.44 (1998) [hereinafter
Teaching Ethics Seriously].
149. See Susan P. Koniak & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the
Signs, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 117 (1995).
150. See Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 148, at 727.
151. See ProfessionalismParadigmShift, supra note 127, at 1231.
152. See Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 148, at 732-35.
153. See id. at 728-32; Russell G. Pearce, Symposium: Recommitting to Teaching Legal Ethics-ShapingOur Teaching in a Changing World: Legal Ethics Must
Be the Heart of the ProfessionalResponsibility Curriculum, 26 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 159, 162 (2001-2002) [hereinafter Legal Ethics].
154. See Legal Ethics, supra note 153, at 162.
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questions. The legal literature is full of stories of students who
raise their hand to question the ethics of a particular legal doctrine only to be told by their professor that the subject of the class
was law, not ethics. 155
The Report's Recommendations offer no way to combat
these perspectives. By assuming, contrary to reality, that the
status quo supported teaching ethics and values, the Report
never made a case that would respond to these deeply and
broadly held views opposing the teaching of values. Without
this change, the Report's specific suggestions (for permanent
faculty to teach values 156 or for the law schools to make clear
their commitment to values) would have difficulty gaining adoption and, even if adopted, would have the same fate as the
ABA's requirement of ethics teaching. The Report's recommendation that teaching values be universal would suffer the same
fate as the universal teaching of ethics becoming "little more
than tokenism designed to satisfy the [ABA] accreditation requirement." 157 Values would remain, at best, a secondary
concern.
III.

Conclusion: The Roads Not Taken

The MacCrate Report offered the opportunity for a major
rethinking of how to define and teach the fundamental values of
the legal profession. By making values a distant second priority, and ducking the most significant challenges involved in defining and teaching values, the Report largely squandered this
opportunity. What the Report has done is to inspire symposia,
conferences, and articles. These efforts, though, appear to have
had the same influence as the Bar's almost thirty-year campaign to promote professionalism through exhortations to lawyers and law students, conferences, required continuing legal
education courses, and tinkering with legal education. Aside
from generating a professionalism industry, the professionalism
campaign has had little or no effect on how lawyers understand
their role or how the public perceives lawyers. 158
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 33-34 (Recommendations 19 & 24).
Cramton & Koniak, supra note 145, at 148.
See ProfessionalismParadigmShift, supra note 127, at 165-67; CHICAGO
ROUNDTABLE, supra note 13, at 407-10.
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The effort to promote values need not be a dead end. Instead of
relying on the assumption that the promotion of justice in legal
practice represents either a mandate of the ethics rules or a
consensus of the Bar, the Task Force should have accepted the
reality of the Bar and Academy, and devised a strategy for
changing attitudes. A more persuasive effort to influence the
culture of the bar would move beyond the Business-Profession
dichotomy of professionalism to an obligation to the public good
grounded more generally in a responsibility that each person,
whether in a business or a profession, has to consider the public
good in their work. 159 As a result, lawyers are morally account160
able for their actions, even in their representation of clients.
In legal education, the only way to promote values effectively is to rethink the pedagogy that marginalizes them. Taking values seriously requires a curriculum of values that would
begin with a first year, first semester course of at least three
credits to provide the foundation for the student's understand61
ing of her training as a student and future work as a lawyer.'
Unless values and ethics rules are a primary focus of the first
year curriculum, they become marginal to the student understanding of what it means to be a lawyer. 62 Requiring advanced courses in the second and third years would integrate
the students' increasing legal expertise and work experiences
into their appreciation of values and ethics. 63 Only then would
the universal teaching of values, which the Report recommends,
serve as a necessary complement to complete the teaching of
164
values.
Today, the task of defining and teaching values continues
to be an important challenge to the Bar and the Academy. The
opportunity the Report missed is still open. Perhaps the Report's goal of beginning a conversation-a goal that has suc159. See Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism,Moral Leadership, and the Law as Business Paradigm,27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 9, 16-23 (1994).
160. See Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers are Morally Accountable,
70 FORDHAM U. L. REV. 1805, 1806 (2002).
161. See Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 148, at 735-36; Legal Ethics,
supra note 151, at 160.
162. See Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 148, at 735-36.
163. See id. at 737-38; Legal Ethics, supra note 153, at 160-61.
164. See Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 148, at 737-38; Legal Ethics,
supra note 153, at 161.
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ceeded-will provide the venue for developing more productive
approaches for meeting these challenges. Signs of hope include
the engagement of a large number of clinical education scholars,
like Russell Engler, who are willing to reexamine professional
ideology and legal pedagogy.165 Many clinicians bring to this
debate a sensibility that may offer a way to ground the development of a moral community among lawyers. Their commitment
to pursue justice in their work comes not from professionalism
but from a personal moral commitment.
Other sources of hope are innovative thinkers and bar leaders, like Gary Munneke 166 and Louis Craco, 167 who are open to
thinking outside the narrow confines of the bar's dominant ideologies. To the extent that the MacCrate Report has played any
role in helping to bring these fresh perspectives to the examination of professional values, it has performed a rather valuable
function. Whether these perspectives result in any significant
changes remains to be seen.

165. See sources cited supra note 2 and accompanying text.
166. Unwilling to rest upon the trite clichs of professionalism, he challenges
the legal profession to transform itself in response to dramatic societal transformations. See Munneke, supra note 4.
167. Under his leadership, New York's Judicial Institute on Professionalism
has indicated a willingness to explore a far broader range of issues than did the
MacCrate Task Force. For example, see the range of issues discussed at the Summit on the Internet and the Practice of Law sponsored by the New York State
Judicial Institute on Professionalism in the Law held on June 18-19, 2002. See
Summit on the Internet and the Practice of Law: Chartinga Course for the TwentyFirst Century, 2 J. N.Y. ST. JUD. INST. ON PROFESSIONALISM IN THE L. 1, 132-64,
171-75 (Fall 2002) (openly acknowledging changes in the practice of law and considering innovative solutions).
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